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Abstract 
This paper examines how different organizational structures in disaster aid delivery affect house aid 
quality. We analyze three waves of survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia 
following the tsunami. We categorize four organizational structures based on whether and to whom 
donors contract aid implementation. Compared to bilateral contracting between donors and implementers, 
donors that vertically integrate and do their own implementation offer the highest quality housing as rated 
by village heads and have fewer counts of faults, such as leaky roofs and cracked walls, as reported by 
fishermen. However, they shade in quality as they lose dominance as the leading aid agency in a village. 
Domestic implementers and the government agency that was responsible for significant portions of aid 
delivery provide significantly lower quality aid. We also examine how the imposition of shared 
ownership, the primary social agenda for boat aid agencies, affects boat aid quality. We find that village 
and fishing leaders steer poor quality boats towards those whom shared ownership were imposed upon, 
often lower status fishermen. 
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I. Introduction 
Extreme disasters catch the public eye, often resulting in massive infusions of aid that affect not just 
individual well being but the fabric of societies. In developing countries, this typically involves foreign 
NGO’s massing to deliver aid in remote and unfamiliar areas, a difficult task. We examine aid delivery in 
Aceh, Indonesia following the tsunami at the end of 2004. The tsunami devastated coastal villages in 
Aceh, wiping out virtually all physical capital and large proportions of the population. The international 
response was huge. For the affected areas, aid gave 134,000 houses for 120,000 houses destroyed (Xinhua 
News Service, February 1, 2009); and all forms of aid totaled 7.7 billion USD (Brookings, 2008), with aid 
officially completed in just over 4 years.  How well such massive amounts of donated money are spent is 
something donors and social scientists would like to know. NGO reports tend to focus on quantity in 
delivery such as numbers of homes or people served—but not on quality. This paper examines a key 
aspect of the aid black box: how the organization of aid delivery chosen by donor NGOs impacts the 
quality of aid delivered.  
Donor NGOs raise money from the public for general purposes and specific causes such as 
alleviating the devastation from a particular natural disaster. Donors can directly implement aid delivery 
themselves or contract aid delivery to specific types of implementers. In Aceh, we identify four 
organizational structures between donors and implementers. These are identified by implementer type (in 
italics) and are: (1) vertical integration, which we label donor-implementer, where an NGO donor does its 
own implementation in villages, (2) bilateral contracting by an international donor with an international 
implementer, (3) bilateral contracting by an international or domestic donor with a domestic implementer 
and (4) bilateral contracting by an international or domestic donor with an own country governmental 
organization, in this case BRR [Executing Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and 
Nias]. BRR was defined to be a short-lived implementer spending government funds and was disbanded 
in 2009 as planned.
1
  
In examining the impact of organizational structure on aid quality we focus on the main form of 
hard aid, houses. The main data for analysis comes from the fieldwork and surveys we carried out in early 
2005 after the tsunami and then again in 2007 and 2009. In 2009, we surveyed village heads and local 
heads of the fishermen’s association in 199 fishing villages in 31 sub-districts in Aceh, and fishing 
families in 90 of those villages. We merge the village, family, and aid information from our survey with 
official government and international records. In particular, we use the names of the donor and 
implementer of each aid project as reported in the RAN (Recovery Aceh-Nias) database, a database set up 
                                                     
1
 Note that the four organizational structures imply that domestic donors only contracted with domestic 
implementers, not international ones. Domestic donors in Aceh were small scale, often Javanese corporations or 
civic organizations that did not have the resources or experience to mount their own delivery or hire international 
implementers.  
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by the Indonesian government working with the UN which recorded aid delivery aspects in Aceh, to 
assign the organizational structure of aid delivery.  
We find that the choice of vertical integration or bilateral contracts strongly affects the quality of 
aid delivered, specifically whether the houses are well constructed or not. We find that donor-
implementers offer the highest quality housing as rated by village heads and have fewer counts of faults 
as reported by fishermen, reflecting their greater ability to deal with moral hazard issues. However, 
evidence suggests they shade in quality as they lose dominance as the leading aid agency in a village. In 
bilateral contracting, international implementers fare relatively well in providing housing quality, 
regardless of degree of dominance. In contrast, domestic implementers and BRR provide lower quality 
housing. We also briefly examine boat aid quality in relation to shared ownership. Several NGOs imposed 
shared ownership of boats to decrease inequality within villages. We find that village leaders steered poor 
quality boats towards those upon whom shared ownership was imposed, often lower status fishermen.  
The aid literature offers little guide as to how organizational structure affects quality of aid 
delivered and we believe our results are new to the literature. There is a theoretical literature on the best 
ways to deliver aid concerned with local government response and manipulation, focusing on issues of 
conditionality imposed on recipients (Collier et al. 1997, Azam and Laffont 2003, Svennson 2003, and 
Murrell 2002), strategic responses by recipients (the Samaritan’s dilemma in Pederson 2001 and Torsvik 
2005), co-ordination across agencies, village “ownership” of the process and the like (e.g., Kanbur and 
Sandler 1999, Easterly 2003, and Paul 2006). Empirically, the literature on large scale aid mostly utilizes 
country level aid data (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Burnside and Dollar 2000) or aspects of cross-country 
project data (Svensson 2003, Wane 2004), rather than micro-data.
 2
 By looking at one situation in Aceh, 
we are holding constant many of the aspects this literature examines. Unlike ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) or planned NGO aid projects, disaster aid is mostly unconditional and largely uncoordinated, 
as was the case in Aceh after the tsunami, and hence provides the context to examine the impact of 
organizational structure on aid quality.
3
 
The next section discusses the organization of disaster aid delivery. Section 3 describes the data 
and present descriptive patterns. Section 4 analyzes house aid delivery and Section 5 briefly examines 
boat aid and shared ownership. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                     
2
 Wane (2004) does look at aid quality cross-countries but focuses on the relationship between aid quality and a 
country’s degree of accountability. Also, there are studies that examine how the salience of disasters affects 
donation (Stromberg 2007) and how disasters affect household health, education, and risk management (Skoufias 
2003, Townsend 1994). 
3
 There is a literature on NGOs, which focuses mostly on hospitals and schools and how those institutions perform 
(Newhouse 1970, Epple and Romano 1998, Malani et al., 2003), but the focus is not on organizational structure.. 
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II. Conceptualizing the organizational structure of aid delivery in Aceh 
Relevant to the organizational structure of aid delivery are the well established literatures on reputation 
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982) and on vertical integration and incomplete contracts (e.g., Joskow 2010 and 
Perry 1989), with more specific reference to the sub-literatures on transactions costs identified with 
Williamson (e.g., 1979, 1989), on property and control rights identified with Grossman, Hart and Moore 
(e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990) and on the principal agent problem applied to 
the theory of the firm reviewed in Holmstrom and Roberts (1998). We briefly apply concepts from these 
literatures to analyze the possible effects of organizational structure on aid quality.  
While we focus on the relationship between donors and implementers, a third set of actors, 
builders chosen by implementers, are important in conceptualization. A builder has a contract with an 
implementer to undertake construction of so many houses in a village. Usually, the basic house design is 
imposed by the implementer. The builder normally buys materials and hires and supervises carpenters, 
plumbers, day labor and the like.  Not only are these contracts between implementers and builders 
incomplete, enforcement in court is costly, given the slow working of the local legal system and the 
potential for corruption in Indonesia. Thus work proceeds in stages, with 2-4 staged payments. Local 
village pressure including intervention by village and district officials may offer some enforcement and 
dispute resolution. But the potential for contract hazards is high. Construction is site and use specific, 
meaning the dwelling units can’t be moved once started and can’t readily be put into other uses. This 
leads to hold-up problems. When construction is partially complete more money may be demanded in an 
attempt to expropriate quasi-rents. This problem may be mitigated by contracting houses in stages- the 1
st
 
ten, 2
nd
 ten, and so on. Thus a crucial part of the implementer’s job is to hire more reliable builders, agree 
on the parameters for house construction, design a contract with them, monitor work, try to enforce the 
provisions of the contract, and negotiate changes as difficulties arise. Their ability to do that may depend 
on experience in contracting in general and in Aceh in particular. But we focus on their incentives to 
supervise the builders.  
When donors contract with implementers they face contract hazards. The implementer in a village 
also has site and use specificity. To fire an implementer throws into doubt the relationships and contracts 
developed with builders. It may mean abandoning work started, or involve costly negotiation with the 
new and old implementers. Thus implementers can also halt proceedings, hold-out, and attempt to extract 
quasi-rents from the donor, as well as imposing delay and bargaining costs. Additionally, there is the 
potential for the implementer to be in league with builders to pocket money in the purchase of shoddy 
materials and hiring of phantom workers. As noted above, it may be hard for the donors to enforce 
contracts in local courts. One incentive to perform is to maintain reputation if the implementer anticipates 
repeated business with potential donors in the future.  
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For the situation at hand, it would seem that vertical integration dominates bilateral contracting. 
In principle, vertical integration removes contract hazards between donor and implementer and makes 
conflict resolution much simpler, although there are caveats in the literature.
 4
 Thus, we might think that 
donor-implementers do better than donors who hire implementers where agency issues remain. However, 
international implementers have incentives to perform because they face international reputational costs 
in the context of the repeated game of contracting in aid disasters. Domestic implementers are less likely 
to face that incentive both because they don’t operate internationally and because in Aceh many were 
short-lived. Thus we might expect more contracting hazards and lower quality housing with domestic 
implementers than international ones.  
In assessing domestic implementers, there could be a distinction between what type of donor 
hires them. International disaster aid donors have little potential for post-aid relationships with domestic 
implementers absent frequent major domestic disasters and would have a hard time pursuing 
implementers in local courts. For domestic donors, there may be some chance of post-aid relationships 
with domestic implementers, and some possibility of court enforcement. However, in the results we see 
no difference in performance of domestic implementers hired by domestic versus international donors. 
Also, domestic donors do not hire international implementers, perhaps for political reasons, high 
contracting costs (language and culture differences), and no hope of ex post court enforcement once 
international implementers have delivered aid and left Aceh. Finally, there is the government entity, in 
Aceh’s case, BRR. Government entities are even more difficult to bring to local court, are a big player 
which may not respond to pressure from local leaders, and has no reputational concerns since it was 
defined to be short lived.
5
 The main goal of this paper is to quantify the resulting quality differentials in 
aid delivered by organization type.  
 
 
                                                     
4
 As Williamson (1975, 1989) points out vertical integration doesn’t necessarily dominate bilateral contracting. 
Costs of vertical integration involve governance issues such as bureaucratic hierarchy and employee incentives. 
Bilateral contracts are more likely arms-length. Vertical integration invokes personal relationships within the firm 
and the potential for subversion of firm objectives and application of incentive schemes. The employee on the 
ground in Aceh has the potential to shirk or engage in corrupt practices because of problems in executing 
hypothetical reward/ punishment schemes in the face of inter-personal relationships within the firm.  
5
 If there is pattern of sequential dominance among the four types of agencies, why do we see four types of 
arrangements in practice?  First for donor-implementers versus international or domestic ones, to operate as a 
vertically integrated unit, donor-implementers had to incur fixed costs of setting up operations in Aceh, a remote and 
isolated region. Overcoming these fixed costs requires a larger scale operation. For small donors, the fixed cost 
hurdle means bilateral contracting may be a better choice. Small donors will hire either domestic or international 
implementers who have incurred the fixed costs themselves to run operations in Aceh. For small scale international 
donors, then, why bilaterally contract on small amounts of aid, knowing quality might suffer? One answer is 
marketing: some international NGOs may have felt pressure in the fund raising market to say they were helping in 
such a major internationally visible disaster situation. But they had little expertise in Indonesian operations, so they 
made a symbolic small scale response.  
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III. The data, context, and descriptive patterns in the data 
III.1 The data 
We carried out extensive fieldwork in early 2005 after the tsunami and then again in 2007 and 2009, with 
survey teams in the field for many months. We surveyed village heads and local heads of the fishermen’s 
association (Panglima Laot) in those years and now cover 199 fishing villages, which are intended to be 
the universe of fishing villages in 31 sub-districts as one moves away from Banda Aceh, the capital (see 
Figure 1). The 2005 survey of 111 villages focused on benchmarking destruction and village conditions. 
The 2007 and 2009 surveys of 199 villages (including the original 111) focused on aspects of the aid 
effort and institutional transformation of villages, such as operations of NGOs, quality of aid, and 
democratic evolution. We also surveyed fishing families, following a panel of about 635 fishing families 
in 90 of the villages we surveyed. The surveys cover many aspects of family and village circumstances; 
here we focus on questions relating to aid delivery in both the village and household surveys.  More 
detailed aspects of the surveys are presented in the Online Appendix. 
In order to classify the aid agencies, we focus on agencies reported by the village head in 2009 as 
having delivered aid in their villages. Each village head is asked to name the main aid agencies delivering 
housing and other forms of hard aid. For housing usually only 1 or 2 agencies are involved in a village, 
with occasionally there being a 3rd. However, village heads couldn’t really tell us about donor, 
implementer, country, religious and the like status of these agencies. For these we utilize an additional 
source of data. The Indonesian government, working with the UN, has also recorded aid delivery aspects 
in the RAN (Recovery Aceh-Nias) database
6
. We use the RAN database to classify agency types, 
particularly whether it was an implementing agency or a funding agency or both in Aceh. In RAN, for 
each project in a village a first level implementer is named as well as the underlying donors, often many 
in number.  A first level implementer is the leading agency that either directly hires the labor to be used in 
construction or monitors any sub-contractors. We map each named agency into one of the four 
organization types, identified by type of implementer.  
We classify an agency named by the village head as a donor-implementer if it appears as both a 
donor and implementer in at least 30% of the villages it provides housing in RAN.
7
  Although we drew a 
30% cutoff, almost all agencies we classify as donor-implementers are always both donor and 
implementer in our villages. Donor-implementers typically have on the ground operations with central 
offices in Banda Aceh, and large teams of trained people in the field. All agencies in this category are 
                                                     
6
 http://rand.brr.go.id/RAND 
7
 In some cases an NGO has multiple projects in the same village. We require for at least one of those they are both 
the donor and implementer  
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considered international agencies as well
8
. In bilateral contracting, we define an international 
implementer, if the agency named by the village head is an international first level implementer 
representing a different, usually international donor in RAN. While their donors face the agency problem 
of monitoring the quality of aid delivered by the implementer, these implementers have international 
reputations at stake. The domestic implementer category occurs when a village in our survey names an 
aid agency that is a domestic implementer or an agency which according to RAN is just a donor and not 
an implementer. As such, the underlying domestic or international donors must hire a domestic 
implementer. As the visible aid agency, sometimes the village head names the international donor rather 
than the domestic implementer— perhaps a function of greater visibility. For example, some international 
donors (such as religious NGOs) sent delegations for short visits to villages where their money was being 
spent. Some international donors and their domestic implementers are intertwined by village heads. Either 
their names are explicitly linked, or in one year one agency is named and in another the other is named.
9
 
The Online Appendix lists the house and boat aid agencies and their classification based on RAN and 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the main variables in our sample. 
III.2 The context 
Fishing villages were the most devastated by the tsunami, with almost all buildings, public works, boats 
and roads destroyed. Our villages account for about 30% of all house aid delivered in Aceh, with much of 
the balance delivered in the capital, Banda Aceh. Destruction is massive. Less than 50% of the population 
survived in the 104 villages around Banda Aceh surveyed in 2005. In the expanded set of villages, more 
survived as added villages experienced a weaker wave force. The destruction of physical capital in the 
overall sample is almost universal, given both the earthquake that created the tsunami and the wave 
following 20-30 minutes later. Mean survival rate of houses for the overall sample is 9% and that of 
public building is lower at 6%, noting that many public buildings such as mosques and fisherman halls 
are built on the waterfront. The survival rate of boats, based on 2005 survey numbers, is under 6%. 
The immediacy and extent of aid are impressive. 117% of “needed” houses were replaced by late 
2007. Need is the number of surviving households less the number of houses that survived. Similarly, for 
boats the ratio of boats in the water in 2007 to surviving captains recorded in 2005 is 105%. Finally, 80% 
of destroyed public buildings have been replaced by 2007 even with the significant drop in village 
populations. By late 2007, the massive aid process had accomplished what it intended—to replace the 
entire physical capital stock. Yet, given the massive response there was money left to spend. More public 
                                                     
8
 One organization, the Bakrie Group, is actually a domestic agency. However, unlike the many temporary local 
NGOs, the Bakrie Group is one of the largest Indonesian business conglomerates and is not short lived and has a 
reputation to take care for. Hence, we classify it into the donor-implementer category rather than including it in the 
domestic implementer category. 
9
 Common examples include NORLINK/Salam Aceh and Caritas/Mammamia. 
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buildings trickled in between 2007 and 2009, although almost no boats. For public buildings by late 2009 
the replacement rate was 96%. House aid continued with an eventual replacement rate of 145%, 
motivating notions of excess provision. Table 1 of the Online Appendix provides a more detailed 
overview of the destruction.  
III.3 Patterns in the raw data 
The raw data indicate that the four types of implementers operated differently and delivered different 
qualities of aid. We start with operations. Table 2 compares the scale of housing aid operation by 
implementer type across the 199 villages, with individual numbers for the 8 largest housing providers in 
our sample. Each village has 1 to 3 housing projects led by different agencies. In villages with multiple 
housing projects, each agency would build the number of houses it committed to on specified plots. Table 
2 reports some numbers at the project level and some at the village level. The table shows that house aid 
tends to be given mostly by one agency in any village.
 10
  Additionally, only 14% of implementer-projects 
involve a third project in a village; and, in 46% of villages, over 90% of housing comes from one agency.  
BRR is the largest single overall provider, but operates on a small scale in most villages. It has a 
relatively high fraction of occurrences where its provision is minimal (under 15% of total house aid), and 
a small fraction where it is the almost sole provider (over 90%). Donor-implementers provide a sharp 
contrast. Their provision is much more focused: they are sole providers in a high fraction of villages and 
are minimal providers in only a few villages they are present in. Overall, donor-implementers are 
dominant [almost sole] providers in 80% [43%] of villages where they are present, compared to 34% 
[14%] for international implementers and 34% [17%] for BRR. The Canadian and British Red Cross’s 
stand out as dominant providers; the Canadian Red Cross is the sole provider in 8 of its 11 villages. Note 
for later reference that domestic implementers at 45% [16%] compared to international ones show a 
modestly greater relative presence in villages they serve, although they are a more diverse group. We 
identified 28 different domestic implementers delivering housing in our villages compared to 12 
international ones. 
In the raw data how does house aid quality differ by implementer type? We report on two 
rankings. First for each housing aid project, the village head was asked to rate the quality of construction 
in terms of the likelihood of “leaky roofs, cracked walls, faulty plumbing, and mould” with 3 categories: 
(i) high (all houses well built) (ii) medium (some well built and some not) and (iii) low (most not).  A 
high rating is a 3, medium 2, and low 1. In the survey, we distinguished early and later batches for each 
agency. Ratings are generally the same for both batches, but if not we average the ratings, so for each 
project our scale can be 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3. For each type of implementer we calculate the average ranking 
                                                     
10
 While BRR is a specific agency, other numbers are for group types. For group-types, different agencies of the 
same type may appear in the same village. For example, if two different donor-implementers appear in a village, 
although that is just one village where any donor-implementer appears, it counts as two donor-implementer projects. 
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over all projects. We believe village heads tend to give high ratings (given they are involved in the 
process); and the measure is coarse. Second, for a smaller sample of villages, individual fisherman list 
house faults: leaky roof, cracked walls, poor foundation, or faulty plumbing, so each fisherman can list 0-
4 faults in his house. We average across fishing families served by each type of implementer to obtain 
another ranking by average number of faults.   
Figure 1 shows these two rankings. While the averages are not significantly different, they point 
to some patterns that in econometric work will be significant. BRR is the worst ranked by both village 
heads and individual fishermen. Donor-implementers offer the highest quality housing as rated by village 
heads, and correspondingly have the fewest counts of faults as reported by fishermen, reflecting what we 
believe to be their greater ability to deal with contracting problems. For international implementers the 
evidence is more mixed. Village level data suggests they have a relatively good record for house quality 
construction. But the averaged fisherman data suggest their number of faults is the same as domestic 
implementers, although in econometric results they will score better than domestic ones.  
 
IV. Empirical Evidence on the Quality of Housing Aid 
IV.1 Base specification and covariates   
We have two base specifications. First is 
pv t tpv v k pv
t
y c D X       ,  (1) 
where ypv is the quality measure for housing aid project p in village v as reported by the village head, or 
by fishermen for their specific house provided under project p. For the quality measure, we look at village 
heads’ subjective assessments based on construction quality and fishermen’s subjective assessments of 
problems related to construction. Dtpv are indicators for whether the village project was implemented by 
type t implementer, that is, donor-implementer, international implementer, or domestic implementer. BRR 
serves as the base type. k  is a set of district or sub-district fixed effects we discuss in detail 
momentarily. We are primarily interested in t  and expect donor-implementers and international 
implementers to have larger coefficient estimates than domestic providers.  
The second specification further distinguishes whether a project is the dominant project in a 
village or the 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 order project by the number of houses given in aid. This order in general 
corresponds to the order of aid delivery as well: biggest projects are for the earliest donor. The 
specification with project order is  
pv tr tpv pv v k pv
t r
y c D r X        ,   (2) 
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where rpv is an indicator for project order which can go from 1 to 3.  Here we are interested in whether 
some implementer types shade quality for 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 order projects.  
In both specifications, Xv are a vector of village level covariates. Throughout the paper, we use a 
common set of covariates for base village characteristics, representing village demographics (number of 
post tsunami households, population survival rate), distance from Banda Aceh, amount of physical capital 
destroyed, and measures of social capital. We include two social capital measures: the pre-tsunami 
existence of arisan groups, or rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCA), and whether the mullah, 
the spiritual leader of the village, survived the tsunami, providing continuity in village spiritual 
leadership.
11
 We eliminate 8 villages with missing or very bad population numbers, 5 with missing 
numbers on houses destroyed, and 7 with other missing data (e.g., GPS readings to calculate distance to 
Banda Aceh or aspects of social capital).
12
 When we analyze individual fishermen’s assessments, we will 
add family controls as well. Standard errors are always clustered at the village level. 
We do not include village fixed effects because many villages have just one provider and many 
agencies operate almost exclusively at one level or another. Village fixed effects would eliminate 
effective variation in implementer types. We control for cultural-institutional differences across villages 
with fixed effects for 4 districts. In principle, a better control would be the 31 sub-district (kecematen) 
fixed effects. This is a tight control, since sub-districts on the coast are small geographic areas of several 
neighboring villages usually with common geographic and social characteristics. When we use the larger 
project level sample, we report and discuss results with and without sub-district fixed effects. 
IV.2 Project-level analysis: Subjective quality ratings by village heads 
IV.2.1 Basic results 
We start with the subjective quality ratings as reported by village heads for the four implementer types. 
Table 3 looks at subjective quality ratings by the village head of each project. The basic results are in 
column 3, where we control for base village characteristics and district fixed effects. For implementer-
type effects, in column 1 we control for the provider for each specific project, regardless of order as in 
equation (1). Donor-implementers and international implementers bring similar positive effects, compared 
                                                     
11
 In Aceh, groups of women meet regularly, with each member contributing a fixed sum to a pot and then taking the 
pot on a rotating schedule. An arisan group is a volunteer association outside the mosque and governance structure. 
While the theoretical work (Besley, Coate, and Loury, 1994) suggests RoSCA’s alleviate credit market 
imperfections, empirical work finds a strong social component to arisan groups (Varadharajan, 2004). Freire, 
Henderson and Kuncoro (2011), finds that village traditions of volunteer labor are better maintained in 68% of our 
villages which had arisan groups pre-tsunami. That paper also finds that mullah survival is important in maintaining 
village traditions of volunteer labor; but that survival of village heads is not, given few heads remain in office even 
two years after the tsunami. Greater social capital could be associated with more cohesion in villagers dealing with 
implementers and builders. We also note that village size and survival rates may affect social cohesion.  
12
 For the 8 with poor government data on post-tsunami population and household counts, including those has a 
strong effect on the coefficient on post tsunami household, which becomes much smaller presumably because of 
measurement error, although still positive and significant. But aid results are not affected.  
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to domestic ones or BRR. In column 2, which represents equation (2), the base case is 1
st
 level BRR 
projects, with effects for 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level projects for that implementer type. We then distinguish the 3 
other implementer types by project level. We note that sample sizes at 3
rd
 level projects are tiny, with 
each cell containing 2.1-4.8 % of all projects. Thus, in the end we focus on column 3 where we constrain 
all 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level project pairs to have the same coefficient.
13
 
The pattern we see in columns 2 and 3 is that, relative to the baseline case of 1
st
 level projects of 
BRR, 1
st
 level donor-implementer projects offer higher subjective quality projects by 0.44 on the scale to 
3. International implementers offer higher subjective quality projects by about 0.33, regardless of project 
level. That is a basic result. If the implementer in the village is an international agency (donor-
implementer or international implementer) they offer higher quality housing, through better monitoring 
and insistence on quality of construction. For other implementer types, BRR offers the same quality at its 
2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level as its 1st level; and quality for domestic implementers does not differ from BRR.  
However, there is a twist for donor-implementers. The gain in quality for donor-implementer 1
st
 
level projects evaporates at the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level. This could suggest that donor-implementers act 
strategically to put less effort into quality as their prominence in a village fades. However for 
international implementers there is no quality decline as they lose dominance; they operate and monitor in 
villages to offer good quality house everywhere. For donor-implementers, it seems care in dealing with 
contractors declines as their dominance declines, a startling finding which robustness is explored in the 
next table. 
Column 4 shows that village characteristics without aid agency controls have no significant 
effects on quality. Columns 5-7 show that, compared to column 3, implementer type effects are not 
influenced by any observable village characteristics. Column 5 additionally controls for whether the 
original village head survived the tsunami and is still in office and the education level of the village head 
in 2007 when housing construction was at its peak. These have no effect on quality and do not change 
coefficient estimates of the other variables. In column 6, adding a fine control for culture and informal 
institutions in the form of 31 sub-district fixed effects has little impact on implementer-type point 
estimates. Finally in column 7, removing all village covariates and all fixed effects also has little impact 
on implementer-type effects.  
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 We thought of similarities to the child quality-quantity trade-off literature (in particular Black, Devereux, and 
Salvanes, 2005), where parents make decisions about children’s education and numbers of children and birth order 
matters. If villages were really in control of this, absent aid agency choices and strategic interaction with agencies, 
we would model quality as a function of whether a project was in a 1, 2 or 3 project village and whether “birth 
order” mattered, or whether this was the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd level project in the village. In this case, we are ordering 
projects by size, and while our information on order is limited, it appears that in general the largest project in a 
village was the first one. In such a formulation, coefficients on number of projects and project order are usually 
insignificant; and once we control for implementer types all traces of order and number of project effects go away. 
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We can’t prove there are no unobservables that matter, but the absence of any relevance of 
observables in affecting quality is an important consideration. Conditional on type, agency housing 
quality is not influenced by any village characteristics which might be matched to agency type. We 
explore this aspect further in section IV.4. 
IV.2.2 The donor-implementer twist 
An intriguing aspect of Table 3 is that donor-implementers appear to lower quality once they lose 
dominance. Here we show there appears to be a steady decline in quality as donor-implementer 
dominance wanes. We first took the column 2 Table 3 specification, removed the constant term, added 
indicator variables for each project level by type of implementer, and then for all 1
st
 level projects by 
implementer type we added that indicator interacted with the fraction provided by other projects in the 
village. While fractions are endogenous, in the model in Henderson and Lee (2012) quality is only 
affected by unobservables through its effect on fractions provided. The only fraction variable across all 
implementer types that is significant is the one for donor-implementer.
14
  We thus focus on a restricted, 
“preferred” specification in column 1 of Table 4, based on column 3 of Table 3.   
In column 1 of Table 4, as the fraction of housing provided by other projects rises from 0, donor-
implementers reduce quality of their first level projects. By the time that fraction of others hits 40% 
(generally about the maximum of others relative to a 1
st
 level project), the advantage of quality for a 
donor-implementer on a 1
st
 level project is reduced from 0.60 to 0.21. Do these effects reflect agency 
policies per se? We worried that they might arise because of differences in the composition of donor-
implementers at different project levels and differential overall policies of those NGOs. In particular, 
British and Canadian Red Cross’s never have 2nd or 3rd level projects and usually dominant housing 
provision in their villages. Maybe the results arise because they have better quality housing than all other 
donor-implementers. We reran the base specification in column 1 of Table 4 for two sub-samples. First in 
column 2, we drop the British and Canadian Red Cross villages from the sample, getting almost the same 
results as in column 1. Then as an extreme, we drop all villages except those where the 6 largest donor-
implementers (UN, WVI, CRS, German Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, Turkish Relief) appeared who 
routinely operated at different levels in different villages. The results in column 3 are not highly 
significant given the small sample but the coefficient patterns are consistent with columns 1 and 2. 
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 The estimates of the coefficient [standard error] of the fraction variables are as follows: donor-implementers -0.98 
[0.33], international implementers -0.23[0.74], domestic implementers -0.23[0.68], and BRR -0.43[0.59]. 
    
13 
 
Composition does not seem to be driving the results.
15
 Finally, we note that replacing district by sub-
district fixed effects in Table 4 has no significant effect on outcomes.
16
 
Given that the outcome variables in Tables 3 and 4 are ordinal variables, we also implement an 
ordered logistic regression model. The ordered logistic regression results are virtually identical to the 
OLS results. The same variables are statistically significant in each corresponding specification. Though 
an ordered logistic regression can be more suitable than an OLS regression for ordinal outcome variables, 
it also relies on the proportional odds assumption, the assumption that the relation between, for example, 
the two groups of 1 and above 1 is the same as the two groups of below 3 and 3. We present the OLS 
results here and direct the readers interested in the ordered logistic regression results to the Online 
Appendix. 
IV.3 Individual level analysis: Quality ratings by fishermen 
Are the findings from the village level data confirmed by individual micro data, for the sub-sample of 90 
villages where we survey fishermen? We have several hundred fishing families who received a house, 
name an agency we can identify and categorize, and have corresponding information on different house 
quality dimensions. Before starting we note that the basic results in column 3 of Table 3 are maintained in 
the sample of 90 villages (Henderson and Lee 2012, Appendix 4, column 3) and that the fishermen 
sample is representative of the types of agencies operating in the 90 villages.
17
   
Fishing families are asked about four specific faults: do they have a leaky roof, cracked walls, a 
poor foundation, or faulty plumbing. We have two samples, although we rely more on the second. First 
are 529 families, where we assign agency type according to the agency named by the household head. 
Second is a smaller sample of 371, where we require an agency named by a household head to match one 
named by his village head so as to reduce noise in household head knowledge of implementer identity. 
Household heads know names of domestic implementers (with Bahasa Indonesian names) and BRR and 
the village head-household head matching has a high rate of success for these. For international NGOs 
matching was less successful. Village heads negotiate and sign contracts with agencies, so they have a 
good sense of specific names of foreign NGOs and who really were the agencies responsible for housing. 
Given the myriad of agencies operating in any lagoon, villagers are sometimes confused about exact 
foreign names and what actual implementer was responsible for supervising the contractor who built their 
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 More generally, we also worked to find heterogeneity of donor-implementer effects by specific grouping such as 
all the Red Cross’s or all Christian based NGOs, but found no consistent evidence of differential effects.  
16
 Column 1 and 2 results are not affected. In column 3 the coefficient on ratio of others is weakened (changed to -
.425) but the sample is tiny and spatially clustered. 
17
  We compare the actual and expected (if randomly assigned within the village) counts of houses received by our 
fishermen by agency types for the larger sample of fishermen. The actual counts and expected counts for donor 
implementer are [174, 178], international-implementer [60, 46], domestic implementer [207, 189] and BRR [118, 
146]. The fishermen data seem to represent fairly well the counts reported by the village heads. 
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house.
18
 We match just over half the sample on name alone and add another 20% by matching by 
implementer type.
19
 The matched sample of 371 has only 29 international implementer projects, which 
makes inferences for this type tenuous. 
Keeping BRR as the baseline, Table 5 reports Poisson regressions on fault counts and probit 
regressions for each individual fault. The basic village variables from before including district fixed 
effects, the type of implementer providing housing to the family, and basic family controls of size and age 
and education of the household head are included as controls. None of these family and village controls 
are significant and we don’t report their coefficients in this table. For total faults, column 1 presents a 
Poisson count model with robust and village clustered standard errors. We note that households don’t 
routinely report faults in all categories: in the larger sample 52% report none, 18% one fault, 17% two, 
8.6% three, and 6.7% four.   
Columns (1a) and (1b) report respectively for the larger and then the better matched samples. 
Column (1c) for the smaller sample removes all village or family controls and fixed effects to show these 
have no impact on implementer types results. In columns (1a)-(1c), consistent with village head results, 
donor-implementers offer lower counts of faults than BRR—a 40% reduction for the larger sample and a 
60% reduction for the better matched sample in columns (1b) and (1c). International-implementers also 
have lower counts although results are statistically weak perhaps because of their small representation in 
the sample. The column (1a) estimate is small, consistent with measurement error in typing. In columns 
(1b) and (1c), for international implementers reductions are 81% and 91% respectively. Domestic 
implementers have similar counts to BRR. To column (1a), if we add sub-district fixed effects, results are 
unaffected. In column (1b) with its smaller sample, the only effect is to strengthen (and make significant) 
the reduction in faults for international implementers. Finally, we note that the small cell counts make it 
impossible to confirm the 1
st
 versus 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level projects effects we found for village heads in Tables 
3 and 4; results are roughly consistent but noisy.  
In Table 5, columns 2-5 report probit regressions on whether the house has a leaky roof, cracked 
walls, poor foundation, or faulty plumbing, for the smaller better matched sample. Donor-implementers 
are significantly less likely to have 2 of the 4 faults at the 5% level, one significantly less at the 10% and 
one just missing the 10% mark.  For international implementers, only one fault is significantly less at the 
5% level and one at the 10% level. Domestic implementers show no differences relative to BRR. The 
individual fishermen results reinforce those for village heads. Donor-implementers offered high quality 
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 Also a village head may name one agency (say, a donor) and the villager another (say, the implementer) when 
both are involved, although we worked hard to overcome this problem (a specific donor typically hires just one or 
from a small set of implementers).  
19
 When the level 1 type is the same as the level 2 or 3 type we assign it as the level 1 type. There are 34 instances of 
these and we also try dropping such cases but the results are similar.  
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aid and so did international implementers but effects for the latter are not precisely estimated. Domestic 
implementers and BRR offer houses that were more poorly constructed. 
IV.4 Examination of selection 
We believe the empirical results are indicative of the causal impact of organizational type on aid quality. 
The identifying assumption is that the chaotic and urgent context of disaster aid delivery after the tsunami 
generated a quasi-random assignment of aid agency types to villages. However, we cannot simply rule out 
the potential for selection on unobserved variables. For example, a diligent and persistent village head 
monitoring delivery may get better quality out of any implementer and associated builders, through 
nagging and development of inter-personal relationships. If there is matching in the sample between the 
degree of village heads’ persistency and types of implementer, estimates could be biased. Suppose donor-
implementers were more responsive to local pressure to hire better builders and to monitor them carefully. 
If persistent village heads perceived this and sought out that agency type, then part of the estimated effect 
will be due to unobserved village characteristics, not the quasi-random assignment of type. A natural way 
to proceed would be to correct for this problem with a selection correction or IV strategy. In general there 
are no observables that meet the exclusion restriction a priori.
20
 Thus we proceed as follows. We first 
discuss why selection on agency type was particularly unlikely in the context of Aceh in more detail.  
Next, we look for evidence of matching and point out that a myriad of village observables have no 
individual effect on quality. Lastly, we look at potential degrees of selection and associated bias following 
Altonji et al (2005). 
First, because of 30 years of insurgency and military occupation, Aceh was an isolated province 
in Indonesia with no foreign and little domestic NGO presence prior to the tsunami. Village heads had no 
ex ante information about what types of agencies would deliver better or worse quality aid or be 
responsive, and no way to gather objective information on agency attributes right after the tsunami, or 
even to be aware of the organizational structure behind an implementer. Our fieldwork suggests that in 
general after the tsunami, agencies showed up in villages guided by locals helping in the immediate post-
tsunami clean-up process, offering to adopt those villages, and accepted on a first come first serve basis. 
NGOs had no prior information about villages. Regional maps of villages were highly inaccurate, and 
centralized information on village characteristics almost non-existent. Furthermore, even if some wily 
village heads could successfully seek out agency types that were more responsive, the heads who 
negotiated contracts were typically no longer heads at time of aid delivery. Because of the settling of the 
30 years insurgency in Aceh, village democracy in Aceh was finally imposed at the beginning of 2006, 
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 One possibility came from the idea that individual NGOs tend to cluster in sub-districts to reduce costs of 
operation. So using RAN, we constructed measures of the extent of clustering by agency type (outside the own 
village) in a sub-district; but resulting instruments were too weak instruments to be useful. Part of the weakness 
occurs because actual clustering is at the individual agency level, not at the type level.   
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years after the rest of Indonesia. In most villages, the village head was a traditional head chosen from 
village elites. Most of the traditional heads did not survive elections and were replaced by younger and 
better educated heads chosen by the general village population (Freire, Henderson, and Kuncoro, 2011). 
Only 36% of these unelected heads were still in office by 2007 and 12% by 2009. Most were removed in 
elections in 2006 and early 2007, with most aid delivered in 2007. 
Second, we look at the match between the housing project’s implementer type and observable 
village characteristics in a multinomial logit framework in Table 6. Since some villages have more than 
one housing aid project the number of observations is greater than the number of villages. We report the 
marginal effects from a multinomial logit regression, looking at the probability of a village getting a 
particular implementer type for a project, for each of the four types. There are 8 covariates, 5 of which 
depict internal village characteristics, 2 of which relate to village head characteristics, and the last being 
distance to Banda Aceh. District (kabupaten) fixed effects are included as in previous regressions. 
Although the overall associations are significant, only one of the 48 marginal effects (including those for 
fixed effects) is significant at the 5% level.
21
 Villages with a pre-tsunami arisan group are 18% more 
likely to get a donor-implementer and about 10% less likely to get an international implementer or 
domestic implementer. It could be that having an arisan group (RoSCA) represents a village as having 
greater social capital appealing to donor-implementers. Of course for selection effects, that only matters if 
social capital also influences agencies to build better houses than they otherwise would and Table 3 
suggests not.  
We then turn to an econometric technique that helps gauge the degree of potential bias that could 
arise from the unobservables, a method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) to the multinomial treatment 
case. By conditioning the error term and the index of observable variables in the outcome equation to 
have the same impact on the agency type variables, we can estimate the selection bias in OLS. The ratio 
of the original OLS estimate to this estimated selection bias shows how large the selection on 
unobservables relative to the selection on observables would have to be to explain away the entire agency 
effect. Section 6 of the Online Appendix explains the underlying econometric procedures and Table 7 
presents the results. The first row restates the OLS coefficient estimates reported in column (3) of Table 
3; the second row presents the implied selection bias in the agency type effects with bootstrapped 
standard errors; and the last row is the ratio of the OLS estimate to the implied bias, or how large the 
selection on unobservables relative to the selection on observables would have to be to explain away the 
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 When we exclude the district fixed effects we find that distance to Banda Aceh has a significant relation with the 
agency types. The district fixed effects in Table 9 are masking a distance effect. Domestic agencies and BRR appear 
to have an aversion to operating in more remote locations. We don’t see that as a match affecting aid quality results 
conditional on agency type. In fact if there was a bias in finding better quality for international agencies it would be 
downward, as distance may make quality more expensive. But the aversion (which was also clear from fieldwork) of 
domestic NGOs and BRR is of interest itself. 
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entire agency effects. For international implementers the negative implied bias in row 2 of -0.078 is small 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero, resulting in a large ratio in row 3. The negative sign implies 
that the selection bias impacts the outcome in the opposite direction to the international implementer 
effect, though the standard error in row 2 is large. For domestic implementers we get a small ratio in row 
3, but the original OLS estimate is also small.  Lastly, while the point estimate of the bias, 0.549, in row 2 
for donor-implementers is large relative to the OLS estimate in row 1, the standard error is also large, as 
are standard errors for all implementer types. This makes it difficult to accurately assess the role of 
unobservable vaiables, but overall Table 7 results indicate that the donor implementer and international 
implementer effects we find in OLS are likely to be valid. 
22
 
IV.5 Delivery of other village built capital 
In Henderson and Lee (2012) we also showed that villages where the main house agency was a donor-
implementer also got, ceteris paribus, a higher count of public buildings given in aid, a higher fraction of 
roads which were paved and more plantings along the shoreline to forestall erosion, in comparison to 
villages where BRR or generally international implementers were the main agencies.  However, as a 
counter-point to their dismal house aid results, domestic implementers as a group did as well or better 
than any other group on these dimensions. There are two main points. First the dominant house agency in 
a village affects other forms of delivered aid although they are not providing that aid, because they are 
heavily involved in village planning and are the one agency that has a sustained presence in the village. 
Donor-implementers often strive to ensure wholesale village recovery and domestic implementers may be 
better connected to domestic officials and government agencies which were more responsible for delivery 
of village public goods.   
  
V Imposition of socio-political beliefs: boat aid  
Another aspect of aid outcomes we are interested in is the high failure rate of boats given in aid in Aceh. 
There are two time dimensions to failure. The first is immediate failure as reported by the local head of 
the fishermen’s association. Many boats were too light-weight or improperly designed for use on the open 
ocean, sank upon first launching due to bad design, or fell apart after a few outings. By 2007 just after 
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 Altonji et al. (2005) point that when the ratio in row 3 is greater than 1, one can have faith in the OLS estimates 
because selection on unobservables is likely less than selection on observables. Given that most of our covariates are 
statistically estimated at zero in equations (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Online Appendix, one may wonder why the 
ratio is not larger than the 0.55 we get. One of the assumptions in the Altonji et al. procedure is that no single 
variable dominate the distribution of the outcome or treatment variable. This is because the covariance between  Xγ 
and Xβ can be large when a few coefficient estimates in γ and β dominate the other coefficient estimates in 
magnitude. In our case, the coefficient estimates on the pre-tsunami arisan variable in equations (1) and (2) of 
Section 6 of the Online Appendix, though statistically not different from zero, were larger than the other coefficient 
estimates rendering a seemingly large correlation between ε and u. 
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most boats had been given, the overall abandonment rate as reported at the village level was already 22%. 
The second dimension is boats that were initially usable but fell apart after a few months of usage, in a 
context where traditional boat last at least 5 years. We estimate that by 2009 at least 30-40% of boats had 
failed either initially or in the subsequent 2 years. We cannot identify comprehensively implementer type 
for boats, because most boat aid is not reported in the RAN database. As such, implementer type is not the 
focus in our analysis of boat aid. We do note from the on-line Appendix that major players like Mercy 
Corps, Church World Services, and the International Red Cross had next to no failures reported, while 
Oxfam and the International Medical Corps, as well as BRR had failure rates in excess of 40% between 
2007 and 2009.  
In this section we discuss boat aid quality in relation to a unique aspect of boat aid delivery, 
shared ownership. Certain aid agencies imposed shared ownership on a substantial fraction of aid boats, 
to try to move away from the traditional owner-crew social and economic structure. This covers an aspect 
of aid which is discussed more in Henderson and Lee (2012) and which is important: the attempted 
imposition of by aid agencies of social agendas and values on villages and fishermen, by imposing strings 
on aid delivered. 
We use the individual fishermen data, which cover 88 villages in the estimating sample. These 
data allow us to tease out the sharing-failure association in detail. For these 88 villages, two international 
agencies, Triangle Generation Humanitaire (TGH) and International Medical Corps (IMC), dominate boat 
aid, providing over 45% of boats to the fishermen we sample, with no other individual agency providing 
more than 5.5%. Donor-implementers for boats as identified in RAN are a small group. Figure 3 
illustrates the agenda of shared ownership and its relationship to boat aid quality. For the 44% of boats 
given which had initial shared ownership, failure rates are much higher than for non-shared boats (53% 
vs. 16%). Also, regardless of failure, joint ownership fails to persist with only 20% still sharing in 2009. 
While the high failure rate plays into that, among surviving boats that were initially shared in 2007, only 
35% still had shared ownership in 2009.  
Why is the failure rate among shared boats so high? It could be that the agencies where sharing 
was a strong social agenda happened to also give poor quality boats. However, there is heterogeneity of 
boat quality within agencies and the village fishing leaders distributed the aid boats. The first question we 
explore is whether shared ownership is random across fishermen or targeted. We assume that leaders 
knew which boats would fail, which is plausible since construction materials and ex post quality as well 
as design are all observable to these experienced fishing leaders. The next question we examine is 
whether the fishing leaders who allocated boats further thwarted the sharing agenda by assigning poor 
quality boats to shared ownership.  
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In Table 8 columns 1 and 2, we look at the correlates of sharing as reported in 2007 by fishermen.  
Family or fishermen characteristics are related to sharing— previous ownership and higher education 
lower the likelihood of shared ownership. Sharing to some extent seems to have been imposed on lower 
status fishermen, who had poorer claims to ownership.  Across villages, sharing increases in villages with 
higher initial social capital (arisan group), which may have been more willing to accept the equality 
agenda underlying shared ownership. Sharing declines as boat aid rises in a village, suggesting that in 
villages with fewer aid boats relative to need, sharing was more likely to occur.  
In terms of aid agencies which favored sharing, it is difficult to separate NGO effects from the 3 
district fixed effects let alone 31sub-district fixed effects; and we include no fixed effects. IMC which 
gave 16% of boats in the estimating sample with an 87% share rate is in one district. TGH which gave 
29% of boats with only a 36% share rate is entirely in another district. As Table 8 shows, IMC has 
significantly more and TGH significantly less sharing compared to the base of small, ungrouped boat 
NGOs. Given all agencies besides IMC and TGH appear infrequently, we tried other groupings. Getting a 
boat from a boat donor-implementer identified in RAND (3.6% of boats), or from BRR (8.8% of boats) 
are unrelated to sharing. Regardless, what drove differences in sharing is not critical to the basic results in 
columns 3 and 4. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8, we turn to failure of aid boat, as recorded after aid was done in 
2009. Failure is not related to household or village observables. However, sharing an aid boat 
significantly increases the likelihood of boat failure, 30% more in column 3. Column 4 shows that failure 
is associated with being assigned a shared boat, not with an implementer type per se. In column 4, we 
examine how sharing versus non-sharing, in association with the NGO group classification in column 2, 
affects failure. The base case is non-shared boats given by “all other” agencies; there are no BRR boats 
left in the sample. No non-shared IMC boats fail so there is no estimated coefficient. TGH and IMC 
shared boats fail at significantly higher rates, by about 40%, compared to the base and even more 
compared to TGH non-shared boats. Non-shared boats by donor-implementers fail less than other non-
shared boats, consistent with the house results. Overall the results suggest that fishing leaders in 
allocating boats in villages knew which were good and bad boats at the point of assignment. They then 
assigned the low quality boats to be shared, to satisfy the shared ownership objectives of NGOs, to lower 
status fishermen, while better ones were put aside for sole ownership. Presumably, this was not what 
donors intended. 
A concern is that people did not like sharing and so they could have used the boats very hard to 
raise money to buy out partners. Could they have used them so hard that rather than starting to fail after 5 
years they failed within 1-2 years or less? This appears not to be the case. In a smaller matched sample of 
2007 and 2009 fishermen, we control for intensity of use in 2007 in terms of length and numbers of trips 
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per week to make sure that higher usage of shared boats is not driving later failure rates. As reported in 
columns 5 and 6 of Table 8, the two usage variables have tiny coefficients and are insignificant; other 
results are the same as in columns 3 and 4. Failed boats were just badly built.  
 
V. Conclusion  
In recent years, many countries have experienced major natural disasters and the massive accompanying 
humanitarian aid efforts have not been well scrutinized at a micro level. Understanding and analyzing the 
organization of aid delivery is essential to evaluating aid efficacy and how donor monies are spent. We 
find that donor-implementers offer the highest quality housing as rated by village heads and have fewer 
counts of faults as reported by fishermen, reflecting their greater ability to deal with moral hazard issues. 
However, evidence suggests that they shade in quality as they lose dominance as the leading aid agency in 
a village. International implementers fare relatively well in providing housing quality, regardless of 
degree of dominance. In contrast, domestic implementers provide lower quality housing. 
We also investigate aid quality in relation to shared ownership of boat aid. Shared ownership was 
the primary social agenda pursued by many agencies delivering boat aid, perhaps in the hopes of reducing 
within village inequality and improving contractual practices. However, boat aid was extremely 
heterogeneous with many boats literally failing. We find that village leaders steered poor quality boats 
towards those upon whom shared ownership was imposed, often lower status fishermen. 
The behavior of an aid agency that operates on the ground is a composite outcome of the 
organizational structure of the donating and implementing arms. Depending on that organization, the 
quality of hard aid may vary considerably within the same disaster area. Monies from international 
governments and multi-lateral funds funneled through the receiving country’s national government may 
be poorly spent. Better dissemination of the links between form of delivery and aid outcomes may help 
private citizens and organizations who donate to NGOs make more informed choices. And the choices 
affect the quality of life in villages subject to natural disasters in developing countries.  
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Figure 1. Map and survey area 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows a map of the survey area, with a blow-up (right side in figure) of the Banda Aceh area 
(upper-left part of coastal area). 
1
 We cover all villages in three contiguous districts (Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, and 
Aceh Besar) going south and north-east of the capital Banda Aceh. In addition we covered the fishing villages in 
two other districts, up to a defined geographic limit moving east from Banda Aceh into Pidie (the last sub-district 
surveyed is Meurah Dua) and moving south into Aceh Barat (the last sub-district surveyed is Meuruebo). These 
include villages on islands offshore. The map shows household survival rates by village (yellow being the worst). 
Unfortunately, the map is based on the post-tsunami government rendering of village boundaries which is grossly 
inaccurate. We took GPS readings of the center (the mosque) of the living area of each village. In only 6% of the 
cases is the GPS reading within the supposed village boundaries. In 15% of the cases, it is over 10 kilometers away. 
Coastal villages are drawn as non-coastal and vice-versa which explains why, in parts of the map, a yellow (low 
survival) village may be shown next to a supposed coastal village which is dark (high survival). Nevertheless the 
map depicts the general survey area.   
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Figure 2. Housing Aid: Quality by types of aid agencies, village head and fishermen 2009 
2.76
2.64
2.43
2.29
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
Donor
-Implementer
International 
Implementer
Domestic
Implementer
BRR
Avg. village subjective rating
 
0.78
1.15 1.14
1.28
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Donor
-Implementer
International 
Implementer
Domestic
Implementer
BRR
Avg. count of faults by fishermen
 
Figure 3. Boat aid: Shared ownership and boat failure, fishermen 2009 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the survey data 
Variables Obs Mean Variable Obs Mean
A. Village level variables C. Fishermen level variables
Total housing aid in 09 190 199.211 Count of faults in house 643 1.036
No. of households post-tsunami 190 177.105 Count of additions in house 643 2.300
Survival rate population 188 0.749 Count of rooms 577 1.920
Mullah survive 189 0.651 Family size in 09 643 4.005
Pre-tsunami arisan group 190 0.684 Household head age in 09 640 42.923
Distance to Banda Aceh 188 67.659 Household education in 09 637 3.551
No. of houses destroyed 185 210.984 Agency is D-I 587 0.317
Dominant provider is BRR 190 0.200 Agency is BRR 587 0.104
Dominant provider is D-I 190 0.432 Agency is Int'l Imp. 587 0.210
Dominant provider is Int'l Imp. 190 0.116 Agency is Dom Imp. 587 0.370
Dominant provider is Dom Imp. 190 0.247 1st level D-I 289 0.208
Number of housing projects 190 1.947 2nd or 3rd level D-I 289 0.014
Percent centrally piped water 180 40.706 1st level Int'l Imp. 289 0.028
Number of public buildings 190 3.679 2nd or 3rd level Int'l Imp. 289 0.014
Number of Co-op buildings 190 0.516 1st level BRR 289 0.135
Percent roads paved 185 53.319 2nd or 3rd level BRR 289 0.166
Plant pines, grasses 160 0.450 1st level Dom Imp. 289 0.370
2nd or 3rd level Dom Imp. 289 0.066
B. Project level variables Have leakyroof 643 0.260
Subjective quality 341 2.4619 Have cracked wall 643 0.328
Objective quality 370 0.7351 Have poor foundation 643 0.207
Agency is D-I 570 0.1912 Have faulty plumbing 643 0.241
Agency is BRR 570 0.1930 Have kitchen 643 0.628
Agency is Int'l Imp. 570 0.1070 Have bathroom 643 0.890
Agency is Dom Imp. 570 0.1579 Have plumbing 643 0.782
1st level D-I 570 0.1439 Evening pray count 632 4.220
2nd level D-I 570 0.0351 Household size in 09 643 4.005
3rd level D-I 570 0.0123 Fishermen in 09 643 0.664
1st level BRR 570 0.0667 Previous boat owner 643 0.499
2nd level BRR 570 0.0982 Fishing family succession 645 0.081
3rd level BRR 570 0.0281
1st level Int'l Imp. 570 0.0386
2nd level Int'l Imp. 570 0.0421
3rd level Int'l Imp. 570 0.0263
1st level Dom Imp. 570 0.0825
2nd level Dom Imp. 570 0.0526
3rd level Dom Imp. 570 0.0228  
  
    
26 
 
Table 2. Housing aid agencies 
No. of 
houses 
given
No. of 
projects [No. 
of villages]
Houses 
per 
project
Percent villages 
where present, 
where 
dominant 
provider 
Percent villages 
where present, 
where almost 
“sole” provider 
(> 90%)
Percent  
projects where 
minimal 
provision 
(<  15% )
7541 117 66 34 17 34
18009 115 [107] 158 80 43 7
Canadian Red Cross 2358 11 214 100 91 0
Catholic Relief Service 2282 18 127 83 33 6
United Nations 2087 16 130 75 56 0
World Vision International 1977 12 165 75 42 0
British Red Cross 1247 7 178 100 57 0
10772 96  [85] 112 45 16 17
Uplink 1390 15 97 73 33 7
4517 61  [56] 74 34 14 23
Habitat for Humanity 
(Indonesia)
1392 14 99 50 21 14
Agency
All Donor-Implementers
All Domestic Implementers
All International Implementers
BRR
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Table 3. Quality of housing 
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.00713 0.00430 0.0140 0.00822 -0.00185 0.0609
(0.0608) (0.0582) (0.0592) (0.0648) (0.0601) (0.0852)
-0.0913 -0.103 -0.110 -0.0790 -0.0929 -0.0906
(0.0920) (0.0871) (0.0875) (0.0933) (0.0851) (0.0843)
0.130 0.157 0.154 0.117 0.146 0.107
(0.0942) (0.0962) (0.0956) (0.0996) (0.0943) (0.110)
0.109 0.0928 0.0930 0.124 0.0730 0.106
(0.101) (0.0994) (0.0981) (0.107) (0.0953) (0.0949)
0.0915 0.0743 0.0783 0.0983 0.104 0.0711
(0.103) (0.102) (0.0995) (0.106) (0.0983) (0.260)
-0.0261 -0.0300 -0.0328 -0.0265 -0.0329 -0.0495
(0.0347) (0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0381) (0.0329) (0.0380)
-0.0467
(0.0816)
0.0957
(0.0821)
0.300***
(0.0951)
0.444*** 0.443*** 0.461*** 0.482*** 0.496***
(0.138) (0.137) (0.141) (0.152) (0.129)
-0.0732
(0.186)
0.295
(0.314)
0.0240 0.0134 0.00445 0.100
(0.181) (0.183) (0.193) (0.188)
0.312***
(0.101)
0.330* 0.330* 0.325* 0.412** 0.349**
(0.182) (0.180) (0.182) (0.204) (0.176)
0.364**
(0.168)
0.335*
(0.173)
0.352** 0.347** 0.313* 0.361**
(0.147) (0.150) (0.162) (0.142)
-0.0331
(0.120)
-0.187 -0.188 -0.170 -0.206 -0.199
(0.188) (0.186) (0.185) (0.186) (0.186)
0.102
(0.186)
0.332*
(0.171)
0.166 0.179 0.135 0.162
(0.162) (0.160) (0.169) (0.155)
0.0819
(0.155)
-0.0728
(0.197)
0.0433 0.0571 0.105 0.0631
(0.147) (0.150) (0.154) (0.144)
Kabupaten fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kecamaten fixed effects Yes
Observations 322 322 322 322 322 322 341
R-squared 0.116 0.163 0.153 0.064 0.159 0.237 0.109
x 2nd or 3rd project
Provider: Domestic 
                 Implementer
x 1st project
x 2nd project
x 3rd project
x 2nd or 3rd project
x 2nd or 3rd project
Provider: BRR x 2nd project
x 3rd project
x 2nd project
x 3rd project
x 1st project
x 2nd project
x 3rd project
x 2nd or 3rd project
Ln(no. houses destroyed)
Provider: Donor-Implementer
Village head survive and in 
office
Current village head graduated 
high school
Provider: International 
                 Implementer
x 1st project
Subjective Quality
Ln(no. households post-
tsunami)
Survival rate population
Mullah survive
Pre-tsunami arisan group
Ln(distance to Banda Aceh)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.  Donor-implementer quality shading, robustness to composition of NGOs 
 
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
0.601*** 0.536*** 0.802*
(0.139) (0.154) (0.421)
-0.972*** -0.740** -0.801*
(0.331) (0.365) (0.425)
0.0199 0.0181 0.675*
(0.181) (0.183) (0.379)
0.340* 0.341* 0.925**
(0.181) (0.182) (0.426)
0.347** 0.343** 0.684
(0.148) (0.150) (0.458)
-0.196 -0.199 0.454
(0.186) (0.185) (0.474)
0.148 0.144 0.711*
(0.162) (0.162) (0.405)
0.0344 -0.0376 0.272
(0.147) (0.149) (0.473)
Kabupaten fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 322 299 106
R-squared 0.169 0.165 0.273
x 2nd or 3rd project
Provider: Dom Imp x 1st project
Provider: BRR x 2nd or 3rd proj
x ratio of others
x 2nd or 3rd project
x 2nd or 3rd project
Provider: Int'l Imp. x 1st project
Subjective Quality
Provider: Donor-Imp. x 1st project
 
Notes: All specifications include village characteristics variables as in Table 3. Robust standard errors clustered at the village 
level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 5.  Housing quality from fishermen data 
Dependent variable:
Leaky 
roof
Cracked 
Walls
Poor 
foundation
Faulty 
plumbing
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.417 -0.596** -0.673** -0.192*** -0.168* -0.111 -0.139**
(0.257) (0.271) (0.276) (0.0695) (0.0919) (0.0681) (0.0698)
-0.171 -0.812 -0.908 -0.265*** -0.170 -0.123* -0.0981
(0.370) (0.526) (0.582) (0.0346) (0.133) (0.0666) (0.0905)
0.0606 0.0602 -0.0826 -0.0927 0.0176 0.0623 0.0702
(0.170) (0.207) (0.204) (0.0690) (0.0888) (0.0889) (0.0878)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kabupaten fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 529 371 371 371 371 371 371
Provider: 
   Donor-Implementer
Provider: 
   International Implementer
Provider: 
   Domestic Implementer
Count of faults
Notes: In addition to the same village level controls in Table 3, household size, age, and household head education level are 
included. Columns (1a)-(1c) report Poisson regression results. For columns (2)-(5), reported coefficients are marginal 
probabilities from a probit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. Matching villages to types of agencies : Multinomial logit 
(1) Donor-Imp. (2) Int'l Imp. (3) Domestic Imp. (4) BRR
Ln (no. households post-tsunami) 0.0360 -0.0191 0.0167 -0.0336
(0.0474) (0.0314) (0.0391) (0.0453)
Survival rate population 0.0352 0.0257 -0.0233 -0.0376
(0.0657) (0.0494) (0.0702) (0.0802)
Mullah survive -0.00364 -0.0148 -0.0286 0.0470
(0.0590) (0.0510) (0.0546) (0.0568)
Pre-tsunami arisan  group 0.181*** -0.1000* -0.0935 0.0122
(0.0580) (0.0572) (0.0600) (0.0614)
Ln (distance to Banda Aceh) 0.0254 0.0357 -0.0646 0.00349
(0.0589) (0.0486) (0.0530) (0.0628)
Ln (no. houses destroyed) -0.0205 0.0192 0.0355 -0.0341
(0.0310) (0.0246) (0.0289) (0.0276)
0.0397 -0.0736 -0.0123 0.0463
(0.0714) (0.0677) (0.0698) (0.0721)
-0.0501 0.0645 0.0479 -0.0623
(0.0638) (0.0582) (0.0620) (0.0664)
Kabupaten dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 349 349 349 349
Village head survive
Surviving village head graduated 
from high school
 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities reported from a multinomial logit regression. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 7. Amount of selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables required to 
attribute the entire agency effect to selection bias   
 
Treatment variable: Donor Implementer International Implementer Domestic Implementer
0.300 0.312 -0.033
(0.095) (0.101) (0.12)
0.549 -0.078 -0.381
(0.416) (0.400) (0.396)
Ratio of estimate to bias 0.55 -4.00 0.09
OLS estimate
Implied bias under equality 
of selection
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported for the implied bias estimates. The ratio of 
estimate to bias is the ratio of selection on unobservables relative to the selection on observables needed to explain away the 
specific implementer type effect. 
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Table 8.  Sharing and boat failure in fishermen data 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.0205 0.000334 -0.0179 -0.0362 -0.0143 -0.0273
(0.0188) (0.0180) (0.0222) (0.0273) (0.0233) (0.0310)
-0.00111 -0.00238 0.00140 0.00384 4.86e-05 0.00382
(0.00244) (0.00263) (0.00343) (0.00335) (0.00379) (0.00392)
-0.0326 -0.0466* 0.0102 0.0239 0.0319 0.0477*
(0.0238) (0.0251) (0.0224) (0.0255) (0.0221) (0.0263)
-0.0929 -0.137** -0.0396 -0.113 -0.0216 -0.0924
(0.0623) (0.0613) (0.0656) (0.0718) (0.0745) (0.0903)
-0.151*** -0.122*** -0.0335 -0.0272 -0.0264 -0.0256
(0.0446) (0.0419) (0.0339) (0.0396) (0.0420) (0.0479)
0.0345 0.0422 0.0123 0.0224 0.0332 0.0485*
(0.0256) (0.0265) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0266) (0.0290)
-0.0607 -0.188** 0.0379 0.0494 -0.0236 -0.0233
(0.0743) (0.0762) (0.0564) (0.0625) (0.0600) (0.0695)
-0.139 -0.0475 -0.430** -0.303* -0.432** -0.222
(0.0967) (0.115) (0.189) (0.176) (0.202) (0.192)
0.0520 0.0513 0.0511 0.0581 0.0821 0.116
(0.0921) fishing (0.0929) (0.0958) (0.0987) (0.100)
0.196** 0.166** -0.0739 -0.0716 -0.135 -0.161
(0.0762) (0.0727) (0.0801) (0.0836) (0.0985) (0.0985)
0.206*** 0.0811 0.122** 0.115 0.163*** 0.133
(0.0647) (0.0773) (0.0542) (0.0714) (0.0574) (0.0876)
0.292*** 0.295***
(0.0892) (0.0954)
-0.183** 0.425*** 0.381*
(0.0901) (0.151) (0.212)
0.482** 0.370** 0.457***
(0.193) (0.154) (0.162)
0.150 0.151 0.0971
(0.221) (0.233) (0.205)
0.0946 0.107 0.180
(0.137) (0.132) (0.166)
-0.137 0.0121
(0.107) (0.150)
-0.312*** -0.298***
(0.0629) (0.0648)
0.00724 -0.00567
(0.0150) (0.0160)
0.0492 0.0785
(0.0506) (0.0551)
Observations 389 389 281 257 212 192
Boat D-I*Not share
IMC*Share
Boat D-I*Share
n.a.
Hours per fishing trip
Number of trips per 
week
Rest*Share
TGH*Not share
Shared boat ownership 
in 07
Family size
Age of household head
Discard boat because of poor quality in 09
Education of HH head 
(levels 1-8)
Pre-tsunami boat owner
Ln (no. fish families 07)
Ln (boat aid 07)
Ln(no. households post-
tsunami)
Survival rate population
Mullah survive
Pre-tsunami arisan group
n.a.
Ln(distance to Banda 
Aceh)
Boat NGO: BRR
Boat NGO : TGH
Boat NGO : IMC
Boat NGO: Boat D-I
IMC*Not share
Shared ownership
 
TGH*Share
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by village are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
